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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NO. 43914 
      ) 
v.      ) ELMORE COUNTY NO. CR 2015-317 
      ) 
BRIAN DAVID MARTIN,   ) APPELLANT'S 
      ) REPLY BRIEF 
 Defendant-Appellant.  ) 
 ) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Brian Martin contends that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed 
a sentence with an excessive fixed term and refused to retain jurisdiction over the case.  
In regard to his argument on the decision to not retain jurisdiction, the State argues the 
information which indicated Mr. Martin had a prior mental health diagnosis, and which 
was not considered in the Mental Health Examination or the district court’s sentencing 
decision, was not credible or was unimportant.   
 The State’s arguments are not only unfounded, but miss the ultimate point.  
Mr. Martin’s potential to be successful on probation if his mental health issues were 
properly evaluated and addressed in light of that information, could be assessed during 
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a period of retained jurisdiction.  Therefore, the district court’s decision to not retain 
jurisdiction because it felt there was nothing it could learn by doing so was mistaken 
regardless of how reliable the unconsidered information was.  Pursuant to statute, the 
district court still had to take that information into account in the sentencing decisions.  
Therefore, this Court should vacate Mr. Martin’s sentence and remand this case 
for a new sentencing hearing where the district court can retain jurisdiction.  
Alternatively, it should reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in 
Mr. Martin’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
 
ISSUE 




The District Court Imposed An Excessive Sentence On Mr. Martin 
 
A. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing To Retain Jurisdiction 
 
The district court needs to consider the defendant’s mental health issues when 
making sentencing decisions.  I.C. § 19-2523; Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 
(1999).  The mental health evaluator in this case was operating on the understanding 
that Mr. Martin “has not been diagnosed by a doctor, nurse, or counselor with a 
psychological problem.”  (Mental Health Evaluation attached to PSI, pp.1-2.)  She 
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concluded, “[u]nless evidence exists that contradicts this information, no follow-up 
mental health treatment or mental health evaluation is recommended for this 
defendant.”  (Mental Health Evaluation, p.2 (emphasis added).)  However, evidence 
which contradicts her understanding of Mr. Martin’s mental health issues, specifically 
that he has a prior diagnosis of schizophrenia, exists in the record.  (See Addendum to 
PSI; 2004 Michigan PSI, CFJ-284 pp.1, 6.)  Thus, the caveat is in effect and the district 
court’s reliance on the Mental Health Evaluation’s recommendation during sentencing 
was misplaced. 
The fact that the State disagrees with just how reliable the evidence of 
Mr. Martin’s prior diagnosis is (see generally Resp. Br., pp.3-6) does not change that 
conclusion.  First, the State’s attacks on the credibility of that information are 
unfounded.  For example, there is no evidence in the record which would suggest 
Mr. Martin’s ex-wife is unreliable, that she was mistaken in, or had fabricated, her 
statement to the current PSI evaluator.1  In fact, she gave the same information to the 
Michigan presentence investigator in 2004.  (2004 Michigan PSI, CFJ-284, p.6.)  The 
fact that she has made the same statements over the course of twelve years actually 
indicates her more recent statement is reliable.  Cf. I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) (allowing the 
admission of prior consistent statements to rebut challenges of recent fabrication).   
The State also contends that, because Mr. Martin denied any current symptoms, 
the information about his prior diagnosis is not reliable or is unimportant.  (See Resp. 
Br., p.5.)  The State’s argument fails to appreciate the nature of mental health issues.  
Just because Mr. Martin may not be currently experiencing or displaying symptoms 
                                            
1 She certainly did not need any medical degrees to offer her understanding of what 
Mr. Martin’s prior diagnosis to have been.  (See Tr., p.16, Ls.5-18.) 
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does not mean there is no issue to be taken into account.  Furthermore, it is ironic that 
the State relies on Mr. Martin’s current self-disclosures as the reliable touchstone for 
understanding his mental health situation, and yet, argues there is no reliable 
information about the prior diagnosis by citing to the 2004 Michigan PSI’s account of 
Mr. Martin’s self-report of his prior diagnosis.  (Compare Resp. Br., p.5 (“he is not 
amenable to treatment, as evidenced by his outright denial of any mental health 
problems”); with 2004 PSI, CFJ-284, p.12 (“The defendant reports having mental health 
issues that had not been addressed until October 2003 when he went to Toledo, Ohio 
for mental health treatment.  The defendant states that he has been diagnosed with 
schizophrenia and bipolar.  However, this information is unverified.”)  Therefore, the 
State’s arguments about the perceived unreliability of this information in the record are 
mistaken and should be rejected. 
At any rate, the fact that evidence of a prior mental health diagnoses exists, 
regardless of how reliable the State believes that information to be, undermines the 
entire conclusion in the Mental Health Evaluation.  (See Mental Health Evaluation, pp.1-
2 (evaluating Mr. Martin specifically on the basis that there were no reported prior 
history of diagnoses); see also GAIN-I (providing more detail of the examination which 
served as the basis for the mental health evaluator’s conclusions).)  This is why the 
mental health evaluator included the caveat – if there were indications that Mr. Martin 
                                            
2 The State cites to its renumbered “Michigan PSI, p.3” in reference to the unverified 
nature of Mr. Martin’s disclosure.  (Resp. Br., p.4.)  It appears this citation refers to form 
CFJ-284, p.1, if the two pages of form CFJ-145 are pages 1 and 2 in the State’s 
renumbering system.  (See Resp. Br., p.4 n.1). 
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had a previous diagnosis, the conclusions would have been reevaluated in light of the 
potential that there was an underlying issue.  (See Mental Health Evaluation, p.2.) 
And even if the State’s credibility arguments have some validity, those arguments 
only go to the weight of that information.  They do not alleviate the district court’s 
obligation to consider that information as required by I.C. § 19-2523, to weigh it in its 
sentencing decisions.  I.C. § 19-2523 (“Evidence of mental condition shall be received, 
if offered . . . .”) (emphasis added); cf. Hollon, 132 Idaho at 581 (“[Idaho Code] § 19-
2523 requires the trial court to consider the defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing 
factor.”).  As the district court refused to consider the information about Mr. Martin’s 
prior diagnosis because it mistakenly believed it was his ex-wife’s own opinion of his 
condition, rather than her recounting of a historical fact within her knowledge, the district 
court did not meet this obligation.  (See Tr., p.16, L.5-18.)  Again, this is the whole point 
of the caveat the mental health evaluator included in her report – if there is other 
information about Mr. Martin’s mental health issues, the evaluator would need to 
reconsider her recommendations in light of that information.  (See Mental Health 
Evaluation, p.2.)  Whether a subsequent evaluation would rule out or confirm the prior 
diagnosis is irrelevant.  In either case, the district court would have a more accurate 
understanding of Mr. Martin’s mental health issues in imposing sentence. 
Finally, the State’s arguments do not address the ultimate question – whether 
this information impacts the district court’s refusal to retain jurisdiction.  (See generally 
Resp. Br.)  Even if there is some question as to the reliability of the information about 
Mr. Martin’s previous diagnoses, if there are underlying mental health issues, they need 
to be taken into account in the sentencing decision.  See I.C. § 19-2523; Hollon, 132 
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Idaho at 581.  The district court did not consider such issues in refusing to retain 
jurisdiction; rather, it explained, “I simply don’t know what I would learn on a rider report 
that would change my view on the appropriate sentence in this matter.”  (Tr., p.17, 
Ls.4-7.)  However, Mr. Martin’s potential to be successful on probation, if his mental 
health issues are properly evaluated and addressed, could be assessed during a period 
of retained jurisdiction.  Thus, there was information that could have been learned 
during a period of retained jurisdiction that could impact on the decision of whether to 
place Mr. Martin on probation.  See, e.g., State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 676 (Ct. App. 
2005) (“The primary purpose of the retained jurisdiction program is to enable the trial 
court to obtain additional information regarding the defendant’s rehabilitative potential 
and suitability for probation.”).  Therefore, the ultimate point is that the district court’s 
decision to not retain jurisdiction without accounting for Mr. Martin’s mental health 
issues as the record fully presents them constitutes an abuse of its discretion.  The 
State’s arguments do not address, much less change, this conclusion.  As such, this 
Court should still provide the required relief. 
 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Aggregate Sentence 
With An Excessive Fixed Term 
 
The State’s responses concerning the excessiveness of the term of Mr. Martin’s 
aggregate sentence are not remarkable, and as such, no further reply is necessary in 
regard to those issues.  Accordingly, Mr. Martin simply refers the Court back to pages 




Mr. Martin respectfully requests this Court vacate his sentence and remand this 
case for a new sentencing hearing where the district court can retain jurisdiction.  
Alternatively, it should reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
 DATED this 8th day of August, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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